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Abstract— Remote user authentication is critical 
requirement in Telecare Medicine Information System 
(TMIS) to protect the patient personal details, security 
and integrity of the critical medical records of the 
patient as the patient data is transmitted over insecure 
public communication channel called Internet. In 2013, 
Yan proposed a biometric based remote user 
authentication scheme and claimed that his scheme is 
secure. Recently, Dheerendra et al. demonstrated some 
drawbacks in Yan’s scheme and proposed an 
improved scheme to erase the drawbacks of Yan’s 
scheme. We analyze Dheerendra et al.’s scheme and 
identify that their scheme is vulnerable to off-line 
identity guessing attack, and on successfully mounting 
it , the attacker can perfom all major cryptographic 
attacks.  
Keywords-  TMIS, Tele Medicine, Identity guessing attack, 
User Authentication. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The rapid development in network and communication 
technology has presented a scalable platform for Telecare 
Medicine Information System (TMIS). The 
communication between the user and server is always a 
subject of security and privacy risk in TMIS as user 
accesses remote server via public channel and an 
adversary is considered to be enough powerful to perform 
various attacks. Thus the secure and efficient authenticated 
key agreement schemes should be adopted to ensure 
security and integrity of transmitting data [1]. The smart 
card based authentication scheme pro-vides efficient 
solution for remote user authentication [6,7]. In recent 
times, many password based authentication schemes have 
been proposed for TMIS [9,10]. These schemes try to 
provide two factor authentication. 
The password cannot be considered as a unique iden-
tity identifier and it’s needed to be remembered. 
Moreover, possibility of password guessing attack is also a 
concern. However, biometrics cannot be lost or forgotten, 
have the merits of uniqueness and need not be 
remembered; but they can be compromised [8]. 
Additionally, these bio-metric keys are not easy to guess 
[11,12]. Due to these advantages, the biometrics based 
authentication schemes present efficient solution to 
mutually authenticate and ses-sion key agreement. In 
2013, Tan [1] presented a biometric based remote user 
authentication scheme for the Telecare medical 
information system. In Tan’s scheme, a remote user and 
server can mutually authenticate each other and draw a 
session key. Moreover, the Tan’s scheme presents a user-
friendly password and biometric update phase where a 
user can change his password and biometric keys without 
server assistance. Recently, Yan et al.’s [2] pointed out 
that Tan’s scheme is vulnerable to denial-of-service attack. 
Further, they proposed an improved scheme to eliminate 
the draw-backs of Tan’s scheme. Their scheme also 
preserves all the merits of Tan’s scheme. 
In this article, we analyze the Yan et al.’s biometrics 
based remote user authentication scheme for TMIS. We 
show that Yan et al.’s scheme login phase is inefficient 
such that the smart card executes the login session in-spite 
of incorrect input. The inefficiency of the login phase in 
incorrect input detection causes extra communication and 
computation overhead. Yan et al.’s password and biomet-
rics update phase is also inefficient to detect incorrect 
input, which causes denial of service attack in case of 
wrong password input. Yan et al.’s scheme does not 
withstand pass-word guessing attacks. Furthermore, we 
present a modified scheme which overcomes the 
weaknesses of Yan et al.’s scheme and preserves its 
merits. 
The remaining part of the article is organized as fol-
lows: Section “Review of  Dheerendra et al.’s scheme” 
presents a brief review of  Dheerendra et al.’s scheme. 
Section “Weaknesses of Dheerendra et al.’s scheme” 
demonstrates the weaknesses of  Dheerendra et al.’s 
scheme. The conclusion is drawn in section “ 
Conclusion”. 
The remaining fragment of the paper is structured as 
follows. In fragment II a brief analysis of  Dheerendra et 
al scheme is given. Fragment III explain the security 
flaws of Dheerendra et al. scheme and fragment IV gives 
the conclusion of the paper. 
II. ANALYSIS OF  DHEERENDRA ET AL SCHEME  
In this part, we inspect the improvement of  
Dheerendra et al. [3] authentication scheme for TMIS.  
The scheme is a collection of three phases: the 
registration, login, authentication and password and 
biometrics update stage. 
A. Registration Phase 
This stage is a one time execution process, when user 
Ui wish to list with the remote system.  
Step 1.  Ui  selects an identity IDi  and  secret password 
PWi  of his choice, and imprint his biometrics Bi . He/She 
generates a random number  bi , and computes Wi =  
h(IDi ||PWi ||ri ). Ui  submits the registration request with  
IDi  and Wi  to S via secure channel. 
Step 2.  S  computes Xi   =  h(IDi ||x), Yi   =  Xi ⊕ Wi, 
where x  is the server’s 1024-bits or 2048-bits secret key. 
S generates a random number R and computes user’s 
dynamic identity by encrypting the user identity using 
symmetric key encryption algorithm such as AES-256, 
i.e., NID = Ex(IDi||R). The server selects the long key to 
resist server’s secret key guessing attack. Then S  embeds 
{NIDi, Yi , h(•)}  into the smart card and issues the smart 
card to Ui. Step 3. Upon receiving the smart card, Ui  
stores N  = ri ⊕ H (Bi ) and Vi  = h(IDi||PWi||ri) into the 
smart card. . 
B. Login and Authentication Phase 
        At any time the user in need to access the far-off 
server S, the subsequent procedure is made.(L1) Ui inputs 
IDi and PWi, and imprints his biometrics Bi at the sensor. 
The smart card computes Ni  = N ⊕ H (Bi ), and verifies 
Vi = h(IDi||PWi||ri) if the verification does not hold, the 
smart card terminates the session. The smart card 
computes Wi = h(IDi||PWi||ru ) to  achieve Xi =  Yi ⊕ Wi. 
S.C generates a random ai = h(IDi||Xi||ru ).Then sends the 
login message < NID, ai, ru> to S. 
 
C. Validation Phase 
On intercepting Ui’s login request message at time T
*
, 
the server S executes the subsequent steps: 
(V1) S retrieves IDi by decrypting NID and computes Xi 
= h(IDi||x). S verifies ai equal to h(IDi||Xi||ru). If the 
verification does not hold, S terminates the session. 
(V2) S generates random numbers rs and R
*
, and 
computes  SK=h(IDi||Xi||ru||rs), NID
*
 = Ex(IDi||R
*
 ) and Bi 
= h(IDi||NID||SK||NID
*
). S sends the message <rs, Bi, 
h(SK||IDi ) ⊕ NID
*
 > to the user. 
 
(V3) On receiving the login reply message message <rs, 
Bi, h(SK||IDi) ⊕ NID
*
 > from S, the SC computes the 
session key S.K = h(IDi||Xi||ru||rs), and retrieves NID
*
   = 
(SK||IDi) ⊕ NID
*⊕ (SK||IDi).  
 
S.C computes Bi
*
 = h(IDi||NID||SK||NID
*
)  and compares 
with Bi, if both are equal S.C authenticates S else rejects 
the login request. On authenticating the server , S.C 
computes Ci = h(IDi||NID
*
||S.K)  and the session key 
verification message to S.  
 
 
 
(V4) On receiving the session key reply message, S 
computes Ci
*
 = h(IDi||NID
*
||S.K) and compares with the 
received Ci,  if both are equal,  S fully authenicates Ui.  
III. CRYPTANALYSIS  OF DHEERAJ ET AL  SCHEME 
     In this segment, we will cryptanalysis the 
Dheerendra et al scheme and show that Dheerendra et al’s 
authentication scheme is insecure against offline Identity 
guessing attack and on successful mounting Identity 
attack, the attacker can perform all major cryptographic 
attacks  
A. Through stolen smart card of legitimate user: 
 A legal adversary ‘E’, if gets the smart card of a valid 
user Ui of the system for a while or stolen the card, ‘E’ 
can extract the secret data stored in Ui‘s smart card as 
discussed in [4, 5]. In Dheerendra et al scheme, as 
discussed in registration stage, ‘E’ can get  {NID, Yi, 
h(·),N,Vi} which are stored in the Ui smart card, Where 
W =  h(IDi ||PWi ||Ni ), Xi  =  h(IDi ||x), Yi  = Xi ⊕Wi, Vi 
= h(IDi ||PWi ||Ni) which means Vi equal to  Wi.  
 
Yi  is available to the attacker as it is stored in the Ui smart 
card.  Now ‘E’ can proceed as follows: 
Vi = Wi = h(IDi||PWi||ri)                         (1) 
Yi   =  Xi ⊕Wi                                       (2)  
From (1) Yi = Xi ⊕ Vi                            (3) 
From (3) E can intercept Xi = Yi ⊕ Vi   (4)   
B. Through intermediate messages exchanged between 
legitimate user and the server S:  
Once legal user Ui logs into the system, the legal 
adversary ‘E’ can capture the intermediate login request, 
login reply messages exchanged between the user and the 
server S.  In Dheerendra et al scheme, the adversary can 
capture login request {NID, ai, ri}  exchanged between Ui 
and  the server S.  
In below subsections, we discuss how Dheerendra et 
al scheme is vulnerable when an adversary is provided 
with one or more set of above discussed values.  
C. Failure to Offline Identity Guessing Attack 
The identity of a patient is often known to all in the TMIS 
system. The users usually choose easy recollective names 
as identity like social security ID, email, phone number 
and so on as their identities. In authentication and key 
agreement phase, the user need to input his identity and 
password to login the server. Even the user intends to 
keep his identity in secret, however, a easy-to-remember 
identity for the user is also easy-to-guess for an attacker. 
Assume that identity is selected from a limited set  of  
uniformly distributed dictionary, then the adversary can 
proceed as follows : 
       When the patient Ui  logs in to the system and sends 
the login message {NID, ai, ri} to S, where NID = 
Ex(IDi||R), .the attacker records it as it is transferred 
through a public channel. In the login request sent by Ui,   
ai = h(IDi||Xi||ru). Among IDi, Xi, ru the attacker intercepted 
Xi, ru as discussed above. Only unknown value is IDi. The 
attacker can proceed as follows to get the identity of Ui. 
 
Step1 : The attacker selects a candidate identity ID as ID
*
 
from a limited set of uniformly distributed dictionary and 
computes  ai
*
 = h(IDi
*
||Xi||ru ). 
Step 2: Check ai
* 
 equals ai, If both are equal then the Ui 
identity is IDi
*
, else proceed to step 1 until the correct 
identiy is found . 
On successfully getting the identity IDi of Ui, the attacker 
can proceed  with following attacks:  
D. Failure to resist user Impersonation attack 
In user impersonation attack, the adversary ‘E’ can 
impersonate as a valid user Ui by forging the login 
message contents. In Dheerendra et al., scheme a valid 
user Ui sends the login message i.e., <NID, ai, ru >  where 
NID = Ex(IDi||R), ai = h(IDi||Xi||ru). The adversary ‘E’ can 
perform the impersonate attack, when Ui logged into the 
system as follows.   
Step 1: NID = Ex(IDi||R),  is static entity which doesn’t 
changes with each login, So only value the attacker needs 
to modify is ai = h(IDi||Xi||ru), attacker knows IDi, Xi, ru. 
(IDi from (C), Xi  from (A), ru from (B) ).  
 
Step 2:  To frame a valid login request the attacker can 
modify ai by chosing a new random number i.e ai
*
 = 
h(IDi||Xi||ru
*
) and sending <NID, ai
*
, ru
*
> . The login 
message will sure pass the checks made by server S.  
 
Therefore, we can conclude that in Dheerendra et al. 
scheme, the adversary can impersonate as a valid user Ui, 
by replaying the previously intercepted authentication 
messages as discussed above. Hence, Dheerendra et al. 
scheme is vulnerable to user impersonation and replay 
attacks.  
E. Attacker can  frame the session Key  
An attacker can frame the session key framed between 
Ui and S as follows: 
An attacker can intercept the login reply message 
from S to Ui i.e  <rs, Bi , Mi>, where  SK=h(IDi||Xi||ru||rs), 
NID
*
 = Ex(IDi||R
*
 ) and Bi = h(IDi||NID||SK||NID
*
), Mi = 
h(SK||IDi)⊕NID
*
. 
‘E’ knows all the parameters to compute session key 
i.e IDi, Xi, ru, rs. (‘E’ can get rs from login reply message).   
Step 1: As discussed above , ‘E’ knows IDi, NID, Xi, ru, rs. 
‘E’ can frame S.K = h(IDi||Xi||ru||rs),  
 
Hence, ‘E’ can decrypt all the messages exchanged 
between Ui and S. 
Therefore, we can conclude that in Dheeraj et al. 
scheme, the adversary can  frame the session key and  
read all the messages exchanged between Ui and S. 
Hence, Dheeraj et al scheme failed to satisfy the 
fundamental requirement of the remote user 
authentication scheme i.e data security.  
Therefore, we can conclude that in Dheerendra et al. 
scheme, Once the identity of Ui is known to the adversary 
‘E’ , he can impersonate the user and frame the session 
key.  
  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The present paper analyzed the security vulnerabilities 
in Dheeraj et al biometric based remote user 
authentication scheme. We have shown that that if an 
adversary gets the identity of  the legal user, then he can 
frame the session key. In future, we will propose our 
improved scheme which fixes the vulnerabilities found  in  
Dherendra et al and other related schemes.     
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